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and a little more than nine pages (203-12) to a discussion of the textual history of the Tafsir, 
including the list of twenty-seven manuscripts "known to be extant." Unfortunately, the list 
omits one of the earliest known manuscripts-Bibliotheque Nationale, Arabe 6962, dated 
Suafi-Abad 895 A.H.-which is easily available and was used by, among others, Paul Nwyia 
in his edition of Simnani's introduction to the Tafsir in Al-Abhdth 26 (1973-77): 141-57. As 
for the discussion of textual history, one wonders why Elias keeps ignoring the evidence first 
adduced by Corbin in Sayyed Haydar Amoli: La philosophie shi'ite (Tehran/Paris, 1969, pp. 
48-52), which leads to the conclusion that Simnani continued the Tafsir written from the be- 
ginning by Najm Razi, not Najm Kubrai-namely, Simnani's own statement to this effect in 
the text of the Tafsir itself (ad Sura 54, M.S. B.N. Arabe 6962, 45a; MS. Beyazit 536, 13a). 
Surely this passage is also found in the manuscript used by Elias. For further evidence, see 
also William Shpall, "A Note on Najm al-Din al-Razi and the Bahr al-haqidiq," Folia Ori- 
entalia 22 (1981-84): 69-80. 
These strictures should not detract from the intrinsic value of this timely monograph. It is, 
on the whole, a very useful contribution to Simnani studies. 
ROBERT D. LEE, Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic Authenticity 
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997). Pp. 224. $62.00 cloth, $18.00 paper. 
REVIEWED BY SHAHROUGH AKHAVI, Department of Government and International Studies, 
University of South Carolina, Columbia 
Robert Lee, professor of political science at Colorado College, has written an engaging study 
based on twenty years' serious reflection. He maintains that there is something called "au- 
thenticity" and that it can be identified in terms of both theory and practice. It inheres in all 
civilizations, but its European roots are his preferred starting point, from the Greeks through 
St. Augustine, Machiavelli, Descartes, Pascal, Locke, and Montesquieu. The debate over au- 
thenticity seems to have quickened with Rousseau, followed by Kant, Herder, Schiller, Kier- 
kegaard, Nietzsche, Gramsci, Heidegger, and Sartre. In addition to these philosophers are a 
brace of contemporary Western scholars writing in the past three decades, including but not 
limited to Theodor Adorno, Lionel Trilling, Marshall Berman, and Charles Taylor. In the Third 
World, authenticity is initially mostly associated with such African(ist)s as Fanon, Cesaire, 
Senghor, and Nyerere. In the Islamic world, where Lee believes authenticity discourse is 
monopolized by the radical Islamists, the Iranian Revolution hastened an already developing 
movement on its behalf. "Authenticists" in any civilization are out of the mainstream of in- 
tellectual developments, Lee believes, but theirs are the most compelling perspectives. This 
is as much due to the failings of false dichotomies (tradition and modernity, for one) as it is 
to its own positive aspects. 
Reading between the lines, it seems that it is perhaps easier to say what authenticity is not 
than to articulate its features. It opposes the embracing of universals and is uncomfortable 
with non-relativistic perspectives. Despite this, it somehow insists on certain commonalities 
of human experience and is opposed to unmitigated subjectivism. As Lee elaborates the sub- 
ject, it helps to view authenticity from at least two levels-the individual and the social. 
"Individual authenticity means that I as a person should be who I am and not someone else" 
(p. 1). At the communal level, it means that "societies must collectively set agendas that 
reflect... the cultural heritage of their own peoples" (p. 1). Its advocates "reject Cartesian 
rationality" and instead uphold "the existence of a mystical human bond deep beneath the 
surface of things" (p. 2). Champions of authenticity do not reject modernity, nor do they wish 
to restore a vanished traditional society; instead, they strive to channel the process of change 
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in such a way that it is "comprehensible" and "productive of lifestyles people would recog- 
nize as spiritually as well as materially satisfying" (p. 7). They want "to break with essential- 
ist notions of truth" but are unwilling "to part with the notion of truth altogether" (p. 13). 
While some authenticists have advanced arguments within a religious frame, others have 
retained an areligious outlook. All "authenticists" agree that "to be regarded as authentic, 
action must reflect not universal moral judgments but individual choice within concrete cir- 
cumstances" (p. 14). Hence, they start from a notion of the self as unique and enmeshed in par- 
ticular circumstances. They believe that humans are diverse in their achievements, yet united 
somehow by an underlying common bond. It is what humans do that is crucial-they make 
their history and their world. Authenticists dismiss the dichotomies of tradition and moder- 
nity-tradition because it undermines the reality that human beings make choices; modernity 
because of the banality of secular rationalism with which it is so closely identified. Finally, 
they believe that rampant individualism, subjectivism, and relativism can be avoided by the 
fact that individuals make choices within specific circumstances-as Taylor puts it, "in dia- 
logue with other human beings" (p. 17). 
These notions are fleshed out in two introductory chapters, titled "The Concept of Authen- 
ticity" and "Authenticity in European Thought." The book's core consists of individual chapters 
on four Muslim thinkers whom Lee believes are exemplary authenticists: Muhammad Iqbal 
(d. 1938), Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), 'Ali Sharicati (d. 1977), and Mohammad Arkoun (b. 1928). 
Not surprisingly, at least in this reviewer's opinion, Lee is most successful with Iqbal and Ark- 
oun (both of whom were and are deeply steeped in European philosophy and social science). 
The discussion on Shari'ati is also apposite, although his knowledge of Western social theory 
and philosophy was quite superficial, and his theory of change a gerry-built construct that bor- 
rows too facilely from Western sociology without examining its underlying structures of ex- 
planation. The treatment of Qutb, in my view, is less successful. Still, open-minded observers 
will find much that is persuasive in Lee's arguments about the social thought of all of these 
writers. 
Some readers of this journal may wonder at juxtapositions such as Kierkegaard and Iqbal, 
Nietzsche and Shari'ati, Parsons and Qutb. But Lee's purpose is to show what makes his 
Muslim thinkers authenticists, and no doubt Western writers have done much to elaborate 
authenticity's central concepts-namely, "particularity," radicalism," "autonomy," "unicity," 
"equality," and "institutionalization." Lee is respectful of these thinkers' ideas while still ask- 
ing probing questions. Perhaps the one major question under which all his others may be sub- 
sumed is: "how do you four thinkers propose to realize your project?" In Lee's opinion, 
institutionalization is the most nettlesome issue for them all. In developing his categories and 
assessing how Iqbal, Qutb, Shari'ati and Arkoun measure up, Lee takes us into difficult ter- 
rain, but we are rewarded by his interesting insights and cogent ways of examining a large 
number of complex issues. 
Lee does well to start with Iqbal, who was known for insisting upon knowledge of the self 
as a preliminary to knowledge about the world. Iqbal's impatience with mere imitation of tra- 
dition (taqlid) and his rejection of Westernization make him a prime candidate for Lee's anal- 
ysis. The self-realization of the individual, for Iqbal, was the requisite for the regeneration of 
human beings everywhere, and, to him, the genius of the Prophet's ummah was its creative 
solution to the problems of the 7th century. It is this spirit, rather than that era, that needs to 
be recaptured. For this reason, Iqbal, says Lee, was a revolutionary, a characterization that is 
reinforced by Iqbal's willingness to entertain violence as a means to break through to the kind 
of society that would provide full liberty to Muslims. 
As noted earlier, I disagree with Lee on Qutb. In my view, Qutb is a scripturalist who made 
ad hoc and episodic references to human beings making their history and to the need to adapt 
their beliefs to changing circumstances. Lee refers mainly to Qutb's This Religion of Islam 
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(originally published in 1962) to uphold the idea that Qutb believed that the individual is an 
autonomous actor. However, in terms of Qutb's theory of society as derived from the overall 
thrust of his oeuvre, I believe that his unit of analysis, the motor force of history, is not the 
individual but Islam, an entity that he repeatedly presents as a reified entity (not unlike Hegel's 
"Geist"). For all Qutb's references to Islam as a practical religion (by which he means people 
should practice it, not just think about it), I am convinced that it is not homo faber (man the 
maker) who lies at the center of his theory, but Allah, "Who knows and you do not know." Lee 
relies on William Shepard's article in Die Welt des Islams (1992), "The Development of the 
Thought of Sayyid Qutb," to justify the notion that Qutb focused on the individual in history. 
In my opinion, though, this begs the question. Indeed, by regarding Muslims to have been 
living in a state of jahiliyyah for so many centuries since the 7th century, Qutb in effect ad- 
vocates a restoration of Medinan Islam. Those who believe that this was not what Qutb held 
ought to show how, then, it can be that generation after generation of Muslims over the long 
centuries failed to get it right, as Qutb sees it; yet, supposedly in the face of their repeated fail- 
ures, all he requires them to do to finally become "valid" Muslims is reach into the recesses 
of their spirituality and live their Islam correctly. In my view, Qutb's message is that it is pre- 
cisely Muslims living in historical time and attempting to actuate their beliefs who have failed 
to be true to their faiths. What they must do, accordingly, is transcend history and be swept 
up into an immemorial hypostatization-an Islam of which Qutb is the gatekeeper. Qutb may 
have made ad hoc references to historical stages, but when one reconstructs his theory, real 
history appears to have stopped at 661 A.D. (with a possible resuscitation between 717 and 
720-the brief caliphate of 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz). Lee says at one point: 
Qutb thought in terms of stages of realization. The revelations received in Mecca entreated 
Muhammad and his followers to reconsider their relationship to the universe; at a second 
stage, in Medina, God pushed them to organize a community . . . [which] achieved enormous 
successes, before monarchy replaced divine sovereignty. The monarchical phase [i.e., after 
661 A.D.], emergent from the early successes, produced decadence but also pointed the way 
toward revival [p. 96]. 
Whether Qutb truly believed that the phase since 661 has "pointed the way toward revival" 
is moot. In any case, it certainly has not brought Muslims into line with the teachings of their 
God, in Qutb's opinion. In fact, Qutb fully believed that the centuries-long "monarchical 
phase," rather than producing a revival, has generated jdhiliyyah. 
Lee's discussion of Arkoun is one of the great strengths of this book. Arkoun is a Berber 
who is emeritus professor of Islamic thought and former director of the Institute of Arabic and 
Islamic Studies at the Sorbonne (III). He also writes in French and is a chevalier of the Legion 
of Honor. Lee has, in fact, at Arkoun's own request, translated into English Arkoun's book 
Overtures sur l'Islam (1989, 1992) under the title, Rethinking Islam (1994). 
Arkoun, influenced by Foucault and other post-modernists, demands the historicization of 
Islamic thought-to show that it is the product of people in actual historical times and places. 
The problem is that a particular version of Islamic thought has been sanctified as a con- 
sequence of developments in the late classical period, and especially due to the influence of 
al-Shafi'i (d. 820). Ever since, Muslims have been prisoners of categories of meaning stan- 
dardized centuries ago, whereas the genius of the early Muslims was that they themselves were 
able to adapt to changing historical circumstances by interpretations that differed from those 
held by their predecessors. Another difficulty is that Shafi'ian and Ash'arite epistemologies 
are entrenched because of the cooperation among political regimes, establishment ulama, and 
dissident clerics/populists, all of whom fear that abandoning the ahistorical approach to knowl- 
edge will lead to their marginalization in society. Yet, without the careful application of critical 
methodologies from modern philosophy, social science, and linguistics, Muslims will always 
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have to gravitate within the orbit of a closed cognitive system that is increasingly irrelevant 
to their contemporary needs. If this sounds a lot like Muhammad 'Abduh's efforts on behalf 
of ijtihad, that is because Arkoun writes within the tradition identified with that reformer. 
Arkoun's opponents, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brother Muhammad al-Ghazzali, with whom 
he had a public debate, cannot easily dismiss him as a Westernizer because Arkoun has him- 
self criticized Western Orientalism and also because he is a scholar who has solid grounding 
in Islamic studies, including a substantial study of al-Miskawayh (d. 1030). 
Lee writes that Arkoun conceives of the Qur'an at a variety of levels: "(1) a set of reve- 
lations . .. ; (2) a diverging set of recitations in the newly emergent Arab Empire; (3) a written 
text developed in an effort to reduce diversity and solidify Arab rule; (4) a foundation for a 
corpus of codified law designed to unify the judicial practice of a multiethnic, multilingual 
empire; and (5) a reflection of universal truth as revealed to the Arabs" (p. 148). He laments 
that it is the last two levels of understanding that have dominated and produced a hegemonic 
fiqh today. Let us think the unthinkable (I'impensable), says Arkoun, by which he means let 
us stop thinking in terms of unchanging substances and essences; let us abandon the glorifi- 
cation of idealism, with its timeless categories such as truth and beauty and reason. Such 
glorification has given the Muslims a kalam that is overwhelmed with considerations of 
Allah's attributes, whereas Muslims are in need of a cognitive system that will allow them to 
live in the world as fully liberated believers in tawhid. 
But Arkoun cannot square the circle-his reliance on science as the way out of the authen- 
ticist's dilemma is finally unconvincing to Lee. Arkoun believes science can reveal the diver- 
sities and multiplicities of human existence, beliefs, and thought. How can it do so? Through 
the "constantly revised principles and methods of objective knowledge" (p. 163). Yet how is 
one to know whether one is making progress or, indeed, retrogressing, queries Lee, if there is 
no permanent standard by which to judge? Not only this, but Arkoun is too utopian in expect- 
ing intellectuals to do the heavy-duty work of reconstructing Islam and then persuade the 
masses to accept their final product. 
In fact, the thought of all four Muslim thinkers has shown the "Elusiveness of Authentic- 
ity," as Lee titles his concluding chapter. The desire for authenticity is a desire for new foun- 
dations, but how does one know when one has created them? As Lee puts it, "the search for 
authenticity ultimately founders on this point of validation, which Islam cannot provide. Islam 
cannot validate a particular reading of Islam" (p. 194). Philosophy is a way out, though these 
writers are suspicious of a rationally driven philosophy. Meanwhile, there are many Islams, 
and significant gaps among the world's cultures exist. The problems in overcoming such gaps 
are great, but in the interim we should thank Lee for his important efforts to elucidate many 
of the key issues. 
DAN COHN-SHERBOK, Medieval Jewish Philosophy: An Introduction (Richmond, Surrey: 
Curzon, 1996). Pp. 205. 
REVIEWED BY ALFREDO FABIO BORODOWSKI, Department of Philosophy, Jewish Theological 
Seminary, New York, N.Y. 
Introductions, whether in the form of books or academic courses, typically lie at one of two 
extremes. Either they offer a merely superficial survey of the subject, or they make the kind 
of incisive statement that can be made only by those few who have mastered many aspects of 
a subject and are hence able to grasp and convey its principles. In the case of academic 
courses, the extremes are manifested in the persons of those chosen to teach them. Some uni- 
